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Both peer-to-peer punishments and rewards can be effective in increasing cooperation in 
dilemma situations. We follow Kamei’s experimental design [2014, Economics Letters 124, 
pp.199-202], except we use a reward option instead of a punishment one. Consistent with 
Kamei (2014), decisions to reward are on average positively proportional to the others’ 
reward to the same recipient. We classify the rewarding types in a similar fashion and find 
fewer anti-social types. 
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Coexistence in society means individuals commonly face a choice between behaving in 
a prosocial manner and a selfish one. That choice is often modelled in social dilemma games, 
such as a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (‘VCM’), also known as a public goods game. 
Much literature suggests rewarding (Sutter, Haigner and Kocher, 2010) and punishment (Fehr 
and Gächter, 2000) mechanisms help sustain cooperation in this setup. It is worth noting that 
punishments or rewards are usually costly for an individual to initiate, both in economic 
experiments and reality. That forms a second-order free-rider problem, although literature 
finds people do engage in both costly rewards and costly punishments (Fehr and Gächter, 
2000; Kamei, 2014; Kamei, 2017).  
There are two important findings in Sutter, Haigner and Kocher (2010). The first has to 
do with the endogenous choice of the institution. They allowed a group to vote on the 
sanctioning institution for the forthcoming VCM game: for a punishing institution, a 
rewarding one, or none. In some cases, the institution was assigned exogenously. They find 
higher contribution rates when an institution was selected by vote. The result holds regardless 
of the institution type, or whether sanctioning itself takes place or not, suggesting that mere 
presence of participation rights improves cooperation.1 The second important finding is that 
given endogenous choice, groups commonly vote for rewarding option and the rewarding 
institution is found to increase cooperation. However, the presence of punishment institution 
increases it even further. 
There is enough evidence to suggest people might base their dilemma choices on the 
choices of others in their group. Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) confirmed the 
presence of ‘conditional cooperator’ types, i.e. people who are willing to contribute more to a 
public good when others contribute more. Such findings make one wonder if people exhibit 
the same conditional attitude towards post-interaction sanctioning, overcoming the free-
riding. Kamei (2014) studied a VCM game with incentive-compatible unconditional and 
conditional punishment decisions, finding that conditional punishment opportunities can 
promote cooperation. He finds (a) the most common punishment type in the population to be 
a conditional punishment type and (b) conditional punishment types to be the second largest 
fraction in the group, following free-riders. The conditional punisher is found willing to pay a 
cost to punish a non-cooperator if others do the same, regardless of how big a disparity in 
 
1 A similar finding was observed in Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman (2010). 
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payoffs may arise.2 Further Kamei (2014) finds only 23.1% of subjects to be conditional 
punishers. Notably, only 2/3 of conditional punishers do not punish cooperative types, while 
the remaining 1/3 punish both cooperative and non-cooperative types. Non-cooperators tend 
to conditionally punish both cooperative and non-cooperative types to a similar extent, while 
cooperators assign more punishment points to non-cooperative types than to cooperative 
ones. 
Kamei (2017) builds on that further by comparing conditional punishment behaviour in 
England and the United States. His main finding in 2014, which took place in the US, was 
also found to be true in 2017, this time in England, that average conditional punishment 
decisions are proportional to those of the other group members regardless of the type of 
punished player. However, in England cooperators conditionally punish non-cooperators 
more severely than non-cooperators do.  
We want to examine conditional rewarding behaviour in a VCM setting for two 
reasons. The rewarding mechanism has received less attention in the literature than its 
punishment counterpart, yet the significant presence of conditional types has been confirmed 
regarding both decisions in public goods provision and sanctioning choices. Additionally, the 
rewarding option might be more socially desirable.   
2. Experimental design 
Our design is very similar to Kamei (2014; 2017). However, after making a classic 
VCM decision, subjects are asked to decide on adding points to other individuals, instead of 
deducting. Each subject is given an initial endowment of 10 points and randomly assigned 
into a group of four. Then subjects proceed to play two phases of the experiment. In the first 
phase, the subject makes a binary choice pertaining to their allocation. They may choose to 
allocate 10 points to either a private or a group account. If they choose to allocate 10 points to 
the private account, their payoff will be 10 points. Should they choose to allocate it to a 
public account, each member of the group, including them, will receive 5 points. In other 
words, the marginal per capita return is 0.5 in this setting. In the second phase of the 
experiment, subjects are shown the allocation decisions made by their peers in the first phase, 
and then asked whether they want to increase they payoff of any group member. This action 
decreases their own payoff by 1 point, but increases the targeted group member’s payoff by 3 
 




points. We call these ‘unconditional addition decisions’. Secondly, subjects are asked how 
many additional points they would assign to a cooperative and non-cooperative group 
member, given that the remaining two group members on average assign {0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 
2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0} to that member. Since there are 9 possibilities of an average payoff and 
two types of player in question (cooperator and non-cooperator), each player has to make 18 
(92) decisions. We refer to those decisions individually as ‘conditional addition decisions’, 
and jointly to all made by the same player as a ‘conditional addition schedule’. After all four 
members decide on their conditional schedules, one is randomly selected for conditional 
execution within the group, thus making such a decision incentive-compatible. 
Standard theory predicts private account allocation and no rewarding, while social 
preference models can predict that some people will allocate endowment to the group 
account, and some reward cooperators (see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Sefton, Shupp, and 
Walker, 2007).  
3. Results 
The experiment was conducted at the University of York in June 2017. A total of 52 
undergraduate students participated in the experiments. All experiments had neutrally framed 
instructions and decisions screens and were conducted using zTree experimental software 
(Fischbacher, 2007). No subject participated in more than one session. The experiments 
lasted around 45 minutes on average. The average per-subject payment (including a £3 
participation fee) was £13.82. 
Figure 1 and Table 1 report the total average conditional reward schedules. The total 
average conditional rewards towards a cooperator significantly increase in the other group 
members’ average rewarding decisions. Significance holds regardless of the rewarding 
cooperator status. Such rewarding choices made by a cooperator cannot be explained though 
a model of self-interest, neither can they be rationalized through a straightforward inequality 
aversion between the decision-maker and the target player. Since a target player already made 
a cooperative choice and allocated endowment to the group account, their payoff cannot be 
more than that of the decision-maker. This instead suggests that the decision-maker: (a) does 
not base their rewarding decision on how big the payoff cooperator obtains, but (b) does base 
their decision on similar decisions made by group members. This result is very similar to 
Kamei’s (2014; 2017) where decision-makers did not take into account the payoff of the 
target, but rather disparity between themselves and the group.  
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Result 1. The total average conditional rewarding decisions are positively proportional to the 
other group members’ rewarding decisions, if the reward recipient is a cooperator. 
Another conclusion from Figure 1 and Table 1 is that cooperators are significantly more 
rewarded overall, as one would intuitively expect. The sizes of the rewards given by 
cooperators and non-cooperators, however, differ. We find that cooperators allocated 
statistically fewer reward points than non-cooperators when the recipient in question was a 
non-cooperator. We do not have statistical power to confirm the same when the recipient in 
question was a cooperator (see Table 1). Further, we find that cooperators receive 
significantly more points than their non-cooperating counterparts, regardless of the reward 
source’s own allocation action. 
Result 2. The non-cooperator receives fewer reward points from a cooperator on average, 
while cooperators on average receive more reward points from both cooperative types. 
Following the logic and definitions of Kamei (2014), we classify the conditional 
rewarder types. We define a free-rider as a subject who does not reward anyone, no matter 
how many reward points the other two members assign to any specific person. We define a 
pro-social (antisocial) conditional rewarder as a subject whose Spearman’s ρ between his 
conditional reward points to a cooperator and the remaining members’ average reward points 
to a cooperator is significantly positive at the 5% level and whose conditional reward 
decisions to a non-cooperator are (are not) always 0. For the rest of the subjects, we define 
the ‘other’ pro-social (anti-social) rewarder as a subject who conditionally rewards a 
cooperator but whose Spearman’s ρ is not significantly positive at the 5% level, unlike 
conditional rewarders whose conditional reward decisions to a non-cooperator are (are not) 
always 0. Similar to Kamei’s (2014) findings on punishment, our subjects’ rewarding 
schedules are also heterogeneous.  
Please see Table 2 for classification results. We find most of our subjects (57.5%) 
constitute the other ‘pro-social’ type, with second largest group (30%) being ‘pro-social 
conditional rewarder’. We do not confirm the presence of any pure ‘anti-social conditional 
rewarder’ type in the Kamei (2014) sense. Other anti-social rewarding types are rare (7%), as 
well as free-riding (5%). Both free-rider types did not cooperate in the allocation stage of the 
game. Other non-cooperators showed pro-social rewarding schedules overall. 
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Result 3. The vast majority of subjects (87.5%) exhibit pro-social rewarding motives, with 
free-riding and anti-social motives being minimal (12.5%). Out of the aforementioned 87.5% 
pro-social rewarders, 1/3 do so in a significantly conditional manner. 
4. Conclusion 
This note reports that subjects’ total average conditional rewarding decisions are 
positively proportional to the other group members’ rewarding decisions towards that 
recipient, significantly so if that recipient is a cooperator. This is captured in Result 1 and is 
consistent with Kamei (2014; 2017) where the punishment decisions of an individual closely 
follow those of the group, regardless of the recipient’s public account allocating decision.  
One important comparison we have to make is between Result 2 in this note and Result 
2 in Kamei (2014). In both settings, non-cooperative individuals punished (rewarded) other 
group members with similar strength, regardless of that member’s past action. In a punishing 
setting such behaviour could initially be explained by ‘spiteful preferences’, in reference to 
Levine (1998). However, in a rewarding setup, non-cooperators switched from spiteful to 
altruistic with a desire to reward everyone. That suggests that non-cooperative types: (a) may 
not care about encouraging a cooperative or a non-cooperative outcome of a social dilemma, 
but (b) may care to use a reward (punishment) mechanism since it is present. Another 
important question is whether non-cooperators’ rewarding (punishing) strength is positively 
proportional to that of the group. Kamei (2014; 2017) finds it to be the case with punishment, 
however we cannot confirm significance with our reward data and suggest that further study 
is required on rewarding behaviours.  
We find heterogeneous schedules, however not to the same extent as with punishing 
setups (Result 3). Let us try to rationalise this by supposing that some people use rewards and 
punishments to distinguish and encourage certain behaviours, while others do not make a 
distinction. The reason why anti-social types (as defined in Kamei 2014) are less present in 
our data might have something to do with non-distinguishing mentality of some players, as 
discussed in the previous paragraph. These two mindsets could be loosely interpreted as ‘I do 
not care, thus I punish everyone’ and ‘I do not care, thus I reward everyone’, which at heart 
are anti-social and pro-social respectively. That leads all non-distinguishers to be classified as 
pro-social in this note, however they might be driven by other motives.  On a side note, 
reward-related free-riding is present, as one would intuitively expect, as some individuals 
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Figure 1. Average conditional reward schedules. 
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Table 1. Average conditional reward schedules. 
Group allocation Towards N  Towards C 
By N By C  By N By C 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
      
0 0.875 0.531  0.875 0.875 
0.5 0.500 0.531  0.750 1.094 
1 0.625 0.438  1.000 1.250 
1.5 0.625 0.438  0.875 1.188 
2 0.750 0.375  1.125 1.375 
2.5 0.750 0.438  1.000 1.219 
3 0.875 0.563  1.500 1.625 
3.5 0.875 0.500  1.375 1.719 
4 1.000 0.656  1.375 2.031 
      
Spearman's ρ, 
between columns 
(1) and (2) 
ρ = 0.633 
(1) and (3) 
ρ = 0.264 
 (1) and (4) 
ρ = 0.852*** 
(1) and (5) 




(2) and (3) 
z = -2.95 p = 0.003***  
(4) and (5) 
z = 1.589 p = 0.112 
(2) and (4) 
z = -2.561 p = 0.010** 
 
 
(3) and (5) 
z = -3.532 p = 0.0004*** 
Notes: Columns (2) - (5) contain average reward points, conditional on the respective average group reward 
allocations from (1). N stands for Non-cooperator, C for Cooperator.   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
.10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2. : Classification of conditional rewarding types. 
Conditional rewarder type All subjects Cooperator Non-cooperator 







    














0 0 0 








 Other pro-social rewarder 23 19 4 
 Other anti-social rewarder 3 2 1 
Total 40 32 8 
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Appendix A: Instructions 
Instructions 
You are now taking part in a decision-making experiment. Depending on your decisions and the 
decisions of other participants, you will be able to earn money in addition to the £3 guaranteed for 
your participation. Please read the following instructions carefully. 
 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. Your earnings 
will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment your points will be converted to U.K. 
pounds (rounded to the nearest 10 pence) at the following rate and will be paid to you: 
 
1 point = 40 pence. 
 
The experiment consists of two phases.  In the experiment, participants are randomly divided into 
groups of 4. This means that you are in a group with 3 other participants. No one knows which other 




Each group member, including yourself, will be given an endowment of 10 points, and then 
simultaneously decides how to use the endowment. There are two possibilities: 
 
1. You can allocate the 10 points to a group account. 
2. You can allocate the 10 points to a private account. 
 
Your earnings depend on (a) the total number of points in the group account, and (b) the number of 
points in your private account. 
 
How to calculate your earnings: 
If you allocate 10 points to the private account, you get 10 points as your earnings. The points you 
allocate to your private account do not affect the earnings of the other group members.  
 
By contrast, if you allocate 10 points to the group account, you get 5 points from that allocation, 
which is less than 10 points. However, each of the three other members in your group also gets 5 
points. Therefore, the total group earnings are 5  4 = 20 points, which is greater than 10 points. 
Note that you also obtain earnings from points allocated to the group account by other 3 members. 
You obtain 5 points if another member allocates 10 points to the group account. 
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Example 1: Suppose that all four members in a group allocate 10 points to the private account. In that 
case, each of the four members receive 10 points as their final earnings since they do not get anything 
from the group account. 
 
Example 2: Suppose that all four members in a group allocate 10 points to the group account. In that 
case, each of the four members receive 20 (= 4×5) points form the group account, which is their final 
earnings.  
 
Example 3: Suppose that you and another member allocate 10 points to the group account, and the 
two other members of your group each allocate 10 points to the private account. In this case, each 
group member receives 10 (= 2×5) points from the group account. Since you obtain 0 points from the 
private account, your total earnings are 0 + 10 = 10 points. Another member that allocates 10 points to 
the group account also obtains 10 points as his/her earnings. The two members that allocate 10 points 
to the private account each get 10 points from the private account, and 10 points from the group 
account; therefore their earnings are each 10 + 10 = 20 points. 
 
If you have any questions so far, please raise your hand. When all questions are answered, we will 
move on to explaining Phase 2. 
 
Instructions for Phase 2: 
 
In Phase 2, you will be shown the amount allocated to the group account by each of the other 
members in your group. In a box set at the right of the allocation information screen, you will be 
asked to enter an integer that you wish to use to increase the earnings of the member who made that 
allocation decision at a private cost. Each addition point you allocate to increase someone’s earnings 
reduces your own earnings by 1 point but increases that individual’s earnings by 3 points.  You 
can assign addition points from {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. These decisions are unconditional. Your group 
members also decide whether to increase your earnings in the same way.  You are free to leave any or 
all others’ earnings unchanged by entering 0’s in the relevant boxes. 
Your earnings are calculated as: 
(i) Your earnings in Phase 1 plus extra earnings due to your received additional points 
minus 
 (ii) The cost of assigning addition points to other members 
Here, “extra earnings due to your received addition points” are three times the total addition points 
you received from the other three members. In case your total earnings are negative due to  






An example of your screen (Note: Numbers shown are for illustration only): 
 
 
There is another decision you are asked to make. Before you are informed of other members’ 
allocation decisions and decide how many addition points to assign to each of them, you will be asked 
to enter numbers, from {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, into a form shown below. This form is called the “conditional 
addition schedule.” In this form, you will indicate how many addition points you would like to assign 
to a member, assuming that the two remaining members in your group on average assign the addition 
points shown to that member.  For example, in the screen image below in the top-left box, you’ll enter 
the number of addition points you would like to assign to a member j (not you) that allocated 10 
points to his private account if two other members do not assign any addition points to j; in the 
bottom-right box, the number of addition points you want to assign to a member j (not you) that 
allocated 10 points to the group account in the allocation stage, if the other two assign an average of 4 
addition points (thus, 8 addition points in total) to j.  
 
The addition points you enter in this form will affect your earnings in the following way: once you 
and the others in your group complete the conditional addition schedule, you are informed of Phase 1 
allocation decisions by other members. Then, all members make unconditional addition decisions as 
mentioned above. After that, one out of the four members’ conditional addition schedules is randomly 
selected to be used. The three members’ unconditional addition decisions and the one member’s 









1.  When you assign 1 addition point to another member, (a) how many points will be deducted from 
your earnings?   [                        ] (b) how many additional earnings will that member receive?   
[            ] 
 
2. How many members’ conditional addition schedules in a group are randomly selected to be used to 
determine their addition decisions?    [                                             ] 
 




Appendix B: Additional Tables 
Table B.1. Individual Conditional Rewarding Schedules and Classification Results, subjects 1-20. 
Subject 
Subject’s conditional allocation towards N 
Spearman's ρ 




0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4  0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4  
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.4107  0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 ρ = 0.2236  C - OP 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 ρ = 0.7246**  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 ρ = 0.7246**  C - OP 
3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 ρ = 0.8944***  0 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 ρ = 0.9747***  C - OP 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 ρ = 0.9618***  C - PC 
5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  2 1 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 ρ = 0.0183  N - OP 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.8660***  C - PC 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ρ = -0.1369  C - OP 
8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ρ = -0.1369  1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ρ = -0.4107  C - OA 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.2738  C - OP 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ρ = 0, p (2  C - OP 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  N - FR 
12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ρ = -0.5477  C - OP 
13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  N - OA 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 ρ = 0.9618***  C - PC 
15 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 ρ = -0.9831***  0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 ρ = -0.9831***  C - OP 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 ρ = 0.8660***  C - PC 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ρ = -0.2738  N - OP 
18 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.8067***  1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 ρ = 0.1732,  C - OP 
19 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 ρ = -0.9746***  0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 ρ = 0.9661***  C - OP 
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 ρ = -0.8215***  C - PC 
Notes: N stands for Non-cooperator, C for Cooperator, FR: Free-rider, PC: Conditional Prosocial, OP: Other Pro-social, OA: Other Anti-social.   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at 





Table B.2. Individual Conditional Rewarding Schedules and Classification Results, subjects 21-40. 
Subject 
Subject’s conditional allocation towards N 
Spearman's ρ 




0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4  0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4  
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 ρ = 0.93541***  C - PC 
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  0 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 ρ = 0.97468***  C - PC 
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 ρ = 0.98319***  C - PC 
24 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 ρ = 0.83915***  0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 ρ = 0.89443***  C - OP 
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 ρ = 0.27386  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = 0.27386  C - OA 
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  N - FR 
27 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ρ = -0.1369  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ρ = -0.1369  N - OP 
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.4107  C - OP 
29 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.1369  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.1369  C - OP 
30 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 ρ = 0.98319***  0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 ρ = 0.98319***  N - OP 
31 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 ρ = 0.94868***  0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 ρ = 0.94868***  C - OP 
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 ρ = 0.82158***  N - PC 
33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 ρ = -0.9486***  C - PC 
34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 ρ = 0.98319***  C - PC 
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ρ = -0.2738  C - OP 
36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  4 4 4 2 2 1 3 1 4 ρ = -0.4392  C - OP 
37 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 1 4 ρ = 0.82571***  0 1 2 1 3 0 1 3 2 ρ = 0.44655  C - OP 
38 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ρ = 0.54772  0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 ρ = 0.83666***  C - OP 
39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ = -0.5477  2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 ρ = -0.9354***  C - PC 
40 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 ρ = -0.8660***  4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 ρ = -0.8660***  C - OP 
Notes: N stands for Non-cooperator, C for Cooperator, FR: Free-rider, PC: Conditional Prosocial, OP: Other Pro-social, OA: Other Anti-social.   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at 
the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
 
